Explain Rousseau's metaphor of the 'stag hunt'. Competition for AI superiority at national level most likely cause of WW3 imo.. For example, in a scenario where the United States and Russia are competing to be the one to land on the moon first, the stag hunt would allow the two countries to work together to achieve this goal when they would have gone their separate ways and done the lunar landing on their own. Here, this is expressed as P_(h|A or B) (A)h_(A or B). [38] Michael D. Intriligator & Dagobert L. Brito, Formal Models of Arms Races, Journal of Peace Science 2, 1(1976): 7788. The corresponding payoff matrix is displayed as Table 8. This distribution variable is expressed in the model as d, where differing effects of distribution are expressed for Actors A and B as dA and dB respectively.[54]. Leanna Litsch, Kabul Security Force Public Affairs. We find that individuals under the time pressure treatment are more likely to play stag (vs. hare) than individuals in the control group: under time constraints 62.85% of players are stag -hunters . There is a substantial relationship between the stag hunt and the prisoner's dilemma. Let us call a stag hunt game where this condition is met a stag hunt dilemma. Using game theory as a way of modelingstrategicallymotivated decisions has direct implications for understanding basic international relations issues. 'War appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modern invention'. In recent years, artificial intelligence has grown notably in its technical capacity and in its prominence in our society. In the US, the military and intelligence communities have a long-standing history of supporting transformative technological advancements such as nuclear weapons, aerospace technology, cyber technology and the Internet, and biotechnology. [19] UN News, UN artificial intelligence summit aims to tackle poverty, humanitys grand challenges, United Nations, June 7, 2017, https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/06/558962-un-artificial-intelligence-summit-aims-tackle-poverty-humanitys-grand. Payoff variables for simulated Stag Hunt, Table 14. In this model, each actors incentives are not fully aligned to support mutual cooperation and thus should present worry for individuals hoping to reduce the possibility of developing a harmful AI. To what extent are today's so-called 'new wars' (Mary Kaldor) post Clausewitzean in nature? [10] AI expert Andrew Ng says AI is the new electricity | Disrupt SF 2017, TechCrunch Disrupt SF 2017, TechCrunch, September 20, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uSCka8vXaJc. Table 11. Although the development of AI at present has not yet led to a clear and convincing military arms race (although this has been suggested to be the case[43]), the elements of the arms race literature described above suggest that AIs broad and wide-encompassing capacity can lead actors to see AI development as a threatening technological shock worth responding to with reinforcements or augmentations in ones own security perhaps through bolstering ones own AI development program. They can cheat on the agreement and hope to gain more than the first nation, but if the both cheat, they both do very poorly. One example payoff structure that results in a Prisoners Dilemma is outlined in Table 7. As the infighting continues, the impulse to forego the elusive stag in favor of the rabbits on offer will grow stronger by the day. War is anarchic, and intervening actors can sometimes help to mitigate the chaos. [7] E.g. Under the assumption that actors have a combination of both competing and common interests, those actors may cooperate when those common interests compel such action. the 'inherent' right to individual and collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter and enforcement measures involving the use of force sanctioned by the Security Council under Chapter VII thereof. In recent times, more doctrinal exceptions to Article 2(4) such as anticipatory self defence (especially after the events of 9/11) and humanitarian intervention. [23] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Pathways to Banning Fully Autonomous Weapons, United Nations, October 23, 2017, https://www.un.org/disarmament/update/pathways-to-banning-fully-autonomous-weapons/. This table contains an ordinal representation of a payoff matrix for a Chicken game. [17] Michele Bertoncello and Dominik Wee, Ten ways autonomous driving could redefine the automotive world, Mcikinsey&Company, June 2015, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-insights/ten-ways-autonomous-driving-could-redefine-the-automotive-world (suggesting that driverless cars could reduce traffic fataltiies by up to 90 percent). Due to the potential global harms developing AI can cause, it would be reasonable to assume that government actors would try impose safety measures and regulations on actors developing AI, and perhaps even coordinate on an international scale to ensure that all actors developing AI might cooperate under an AI Coordination Regime[35] that sets, monitors, and enforces standards to maximize safety. This same dynamic could hold true in the development of an AI Coordination Regime, where actors can decide whether to abide by the Coordination Regime or find a way to cheat. Additionally, both actors can expect a greater return if they both cooperate rather than both defect. arguing that territorial conflicts in international relations follow a strategic logic but one defined by the cost-benefit calculations that . GAME THEORY FOR INTERNATIONAL ACCORDS - University of South Carolina N-person stag hunt dilemmas Jorge M. Pachecol'*, Francisco C. Santos2, Max O. Souza3 and Brian Skyrms4 . 0000003954 00000 n Dipali Mukhopadhyay is an associate professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University and the author of Warlords, Strongman Governors, and the State in Afghanistan (Cambridge University Press, 2014). [6] See infra at Section 2.2 Relevant Actors. See Carl Shulman, Arms Control and Intelligence Explosions, 7th European Conference on Computing and Philosophy, Bellaterra, Spain, July 24, 2009: 6. First, I survey the relevant background of AI development and coordination by summarizing the literature on the expected benefits and harms from developing AI and what actors are relevant in an international safety context. 0000004367 00000 n [49] For example, see Glenn H. Snyder Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken Models in International Politics, International Studies Quarterly 15, 1(1971): 66103 and Downs et al., Arms Races and Cooperation., [50] Snyder, Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken Models in International Politics., [51] Snyder, Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken Models in International Politics.. Stag hunt definition: a hunt carried out to find and kill stags | Meaning, pronunciation, translations and examples [5] As a result, it is becoming increasingly vital to understand and develop strategies to manage the human process of developing AI. If they are discovered, or do not cooperate, the stag will flee, and all will go hungry. As a result, this could reduce a rival actors perceived relative benefits gained from developing AI. Since the payoff of hunting the stags is higher, these interactions lead to an environment in which the Stag Hunters prosper. As stated, which model (Prisoners Dilemma, Chicken, Deadlock, or Stag Hunt) you think accurately depicts the AI Coordination Problem (and which resulting policies should be pursued) depends on the structure of payoffs to cooperating or defecting. The dilemma is that if one hunter waits, he risks one of his fellows killing the hare for himself, sacrificing everyone else. Together, the likelihood of winning and the likelihood of lagging = 1. 2020 Yale International Relations Association | New Haven, CT, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610026/algorithms-are-making-american-inequality-worse/, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/AI%20NatSec%20-%20final.pdf, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence, Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and the Economy, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/business/china-artificial-intelligence.html, Interview with YPG volunteer soldier Brace Belden, Shaping Saddam: How the Media Mythologized A Monster Honorable Mention, Probability Actor A believes it will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor B believes Actor A will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor A believes Actor B will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor B believes it will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor A believes AI Coordination Regime will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor B believes AI Coordination Regime will develop a beneficial AI, Percent of benefits Actor A can expect to receive from an AI Coordination Regime, Percent of benefits Actor B can expect to receive from an AI Coordination Regime, Actor As perceived utility from developing beneficial AI, Actor Bs perceived utility from developing beneficial AI, Probability Actor A believes it will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor B believes Actor A will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor A believes Actor B will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor B believes it will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor A believes AI Coordination Regime will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor B believes AI Coordination Regime will develop a harmful AI, Actor As perceived harm from developing a harmful AI, Actor Bs perceived harm from developing a harmful AI. Different social/cultural systems are prone to clash. [43] Edward Moore Geist, Its already too late to stop the AI arms race We must manage it instead, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 72, 5(2016): 318321. What is coercive bargaining and the Stag Hunt? Give an example 15. The stag hunt differs from the prisoner's dilemma in that there are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria:[2] one where both players cooperate, and one where both players defect. On the face of it, it seems that the players can then 'agree' to play (c,c); though the agreement is not enforceable, it removes each player's doubt about the other one playing c". [24] Defined by Bostrom as an intellect that is much smarter than the best human brains in practically every field, including scientific creativity, general wisdom and social skills, Nick Bostrom, How long before suerintelligence? Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 5, 1(2006): 11-30. Interestingly enough, the Stag Hunt theory can be used to describe social contracts within society, with the contract being the one to hunt the stag or achieve mutual benefit. [12] Apple Inc., Siri, https://www.apple.com/ios/siri/. Collision isdisastrousfor everyone, but swerving is losing bad too. But cooperation is not easy. Every country operates selfishly in the international order. PRICE CODE 17. As stated before, achieving a scenario where both actors perceive to be in a Stag Hunt is the most desirable situation for maximizing safety from an AI catastrophe, since both actors are primed to cooperate and will maximize their benefits from doing so. But who can we expect to open the Box? I will apply them to IR and give an example for each. [46] Charles Glaser, Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help, International Security 19, 3(1994): 50-90. (required), 2023 Cornell University Powered by Edublogs Campus and running on blogs.cornell.edu, The Stag Hunt Theory and the Formation Social of Contracts, http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~bskyrms/bio/papers/StagHunt.pdf. might complicate coordination efforts. An example of the game of Stag Hunt can be illustrated by neighbours with a large hedge that forms the boundary between their properties. ? 201-206. 0000016685 00000 n Finally, Jervis[40] also highlights the security dilemma where increases in an actors security can inherently lead to the decreased security of a rival state. Whereas the short-term impact of AI depends on who controls it, the long-term impact depends now whether it can be controlled at all.[26]. [37] Samuel P. Huntington, Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results, Public Policy 8 (1958): 4186. In a case with a random group of people, most would choose not to trust strangers with their success. Learn how and when to remove these template messages, Learn how and when to remove this template message, "Uses of Game Theory in International Relations", "On Adaptive Emergence of Trust Behavior in the Game of Stag Hunt", "Stag Hunt: Anti-Corruption Disclosures Concerning Natural Resources", https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Stag_hunt&oldid=1137589086, Articles that may contain original research from November 2018, All articles that may contain original research, Articles needing additional references from November 2018, All articles needing additional references, Wikipedia articles that are too technical from July 2018, Articles with multiple maintenance issues, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License 3.0, This page was last edited on 5 February 2023, at 12:51. On the other hand, Glaser[46] argues that rational actors under certain conditions might opt for cooperative policies. %PDF-1.7 % In this paper, I develop a simple theory to explain whether two international actors are likely to cooperate or compete in developing AI and analyze what variables factor into this assessment. In addition to boasting the worlds largest economies, China and the U.S. also lead the world in A.I. As a result of this, security-seeking actions such as increasing technical capacity (even if this is not explicitly offensive this is particularly relevant to wide-encompassing capacity of AI) can be perceived as threatening and met with exacerbated race dynamics. In the most common account of this dilemma, which is quite different from Rousseau's, two hunters must decide separately, and without the other knowing, whether to hunt a stag or a hare. Advanced AI technologies have the potential to provide transformative social and economic benefits like preventing deaths in auto collisions,[17] drastically improving healthcare,[18] reducing poverty through economic bounty,[19] and potentially even finding solutions to some of our most menacing problems like climate change.[20]. I thank my advisor, Professor Allan Dafoe, for his time, support, and introduction to this papers subject matter in his Global Politics of AI seminar. Altogether, the considerations discussed are displayed in Table 6 as a payoff matrix. (e.g., including games such as Chicken and Stag Hunt). Here if they all act together they can successfully reproduce, but success depends on the cooperation of many individual protozoa. The Stag Hunt The Stag Hunt is a story that became a game. What is the 'New Barbarism' view of contemporary conflicts? In a security dilemma, each state cannot trust the other to cooperate. The article states that the only difference between the two scenarios is that the localized group decided to hunt hares more quickly. It is his argument: "The information that such an agreement conveys is not that the players will keep it (since it is not binding), but that each wants the other to keep it." Stag Hunt is a game in which the players must cooperate in order to hunt larger game, and with higher participation, they are able to get a better dinner. Economic Theory of Networks at Temple University, Economic theory of networks course discussion. Although most authors focus on the prisoner's dilemma as the game that best represents the problem of social cooperation, some authors believe that the stag hunt represents an equally (or more) interesting context in which to study cooperation and its problems (for an overview see Skyrms 2004). Similar to the Prisoners Dilemma, Chicken occurs when each actors greatest preference would be to defect while their opponent cooperates. But, at various critical junctures, including the countrys highly contentious presidential elections in 2009 and 2014, rivals have ultimately opted to stick with the state rather than contest it. (1) the responsibility of the state to protect its own population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement; What is the difference between structural and operational conflict prevention? A major terrorist attack launched from Afghanistan would represent a kind of equal opportunity disaster and should make a commitment to establishing and preserving a capable state of ultimate value to all involved. Additional readings provide insight on arms characteristics that impact race dynamics. What is the so-called 'holy trinity' of peacekeeping? Additionally, the feedback, discussion, resource recommendations, and inspiring work of friends, colleagues, and mentors in several time zones especially Amy Fan, Carrick Flynn, Will Hunt, Jade Leung, Matthijs Maas, Peter McIntyre, Professor Nuno Monteiro, Gabe Rissman, Thomas Weng, Baobao Zhang, and Remco Zwetsloot were vital to this paper and are profoundly appreciated. The primary difference between the Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken, however, is that both actors failing to cooperate is the least desired outcome of the game. How does the Just War Tradition position itself in relation to both Realism and Pacifism? Within these levels of analysis, there are different theories that have could be considered. > Two players, simultaneous decisions. In 2016, the Obama Administration developed two reports on the future of AI. Finally, I discuss the relevant policy and strategic implications this theory has on achieving international AI coordination, and assess the strengths and limitations of the theory in practice. Payoff matrix for simulated Chicken game. [31] Meanwhile, U.S. military and intelligence agencies like the NSA and DARPA continue to fund public AI research. The response from Kabul involved a predictable combination of derision and alarm, for fear that bargaining will commence on terms beyond the current administrations control.

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